This paper aims to identify some new determinants of the quality of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of Proprietary Costs Theory. The identified new determinants are correspondence between segments and legally identifiable subgroups of companies, level of detail in segment definition, listing status age and growth rate. The paper also provides further evidence to test the impact of some traditional determinants, which are introduced in the model as control variables. The study is carried out in Italy, which proves to be a particularly suitable setting for the analysis because of its limited legal and professional requirements on the topic. To test the hypotheses, a sample of 67 Italian listed companies was selected and a multiple regression model was used. Except for growth rate, all the other new determinants proved to be significantly related to segment reporting quality, consistently to what hypothesized. These results confirm that proprietary costs are particularly relevant for segment reporting, thus limiting the incentive for the companies to provide this information to the market.
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to identify some new determinants of the quality of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of Proprietary Costs Theory. A number of previous studies carried out in different countries successfully tested hypotheses relating segment reporting quality to firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size, ownership structure, financial leverage and profitability. This study identifies new factors potentially able to explain voluntary segment disclosure, such as correspondence between segments and legally identifiable subgroups of companies, level of detail in segment definition, listing status age and growth rate. At the same time it provides further evidence to test the impact of the above-mentioned traditional determinants.
Segment reporting quality is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of items disclosed, allowing for the decreasing marginal impact of each additional item on disclosure quality. A multiple regression model is employed to test the hypotheses.
Because of its limited legal requirements and professional accounting standards on the topic, Italy provides a particularly suitable setting for the test of hypotheses related to voluntary segment disclosure. This is the first empirical study on segment reporting carried out in Italy and is just a part of a wider research project aimed at evaluating the costs and benefits of higher quality disclosure by listed companies. It is focused on segment reporting in consolidated financial statements, but conclusions may be generalized to segment disclosure in individual companies' annual report as well. The results reported may be of particular interest to regulators when evaluating mandatory disclosure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the institutional setting in which the analysis takes place. In particular, Italian regulation on segment reporting is described. In section 3 the theoretical background and the specific hypotheses to be tested are presented. Section 4 describes the research design and methodology. Here, the sample selection and the measurement of both the dependent and the explanatory variables are discussed. In section 5 the results of the multivariate test are presented. Finally some conclusions are drawn.
THE ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL SETTING ON SEGMENT REPORTING
In Italy legal requirements on segment reporting are very limited. Prior to the implementation of the IV and VII EU Accounting Directives into Italian law, companies were not required to disclose any segmental information. Of course managers could voluntarily include some segment information in the Directors' Report, but there was no obligation to disclose it.
Since the issue of the Legislative Decree n. 127 in 1991 1 companies have been obliged to report their sales segmented by "categories of activities" and "geographical areas" in the Notes to Accounts, but only if this information is relevant. At the same time, comments about the company's performance in its different "sectors of activities" must be reported in the Directors' Report, with particular reference to costs, sales and investments 2 . No details or explanations are given as regards the actual definition of "categories of activities", "geographical areas" and "sectors of activities", nor about the way information requested has to be disclosed.
Italian accounting standards, drawn by professionals and academicians in order to integrate the law wherever this proves not to be complete or clear enough, do not deal specifically with segment reporting either (C.N. D.C. and C.N.R., 1994, 1996) .
The only specific requirement to disclose segment data is stated in the Communication 
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The theoretical framework
A number of previous studies carried out in different countries already tested hypotheses relating segment reporting quality to firm-specific characteristics, according to a Positive Accounting approach Zimmermann, 1978, 1986 (Verrecchia, 1983 (Verrecchia, , 1990 Wagenhofer, 1990) states that companies limit voluntary disclosure of information to the financial market because of the existence of disclosurerelated costs (proprietary costs). These costs include not only the costs of preparing and disseminating information but also the cost deriving from disclosing information which may be used by competitors and other parties in a way which is harmful for the reporting company. Proprietary Costs Theory is based on the assumption that, in the absence of these costs, companies are incentived to voluntarily disclose relevant information to the market in order to reduce information asymmetry and, consequently, the cost of capital ( Verrecchia, 1983; Diamond, 1985) , as traditionally stated by
Signalling Theory (Spence, 1973; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Morris, 1987) . The existence of proprietary costs introduces some noise in the equilibrium model.
According to Verrecchia (1983) , the higher the proprietary costs associated to the disclosure, the less negatively investors react to the withholding of relevant information, thus the less probably companies voluntarily disclose information.
That segment reporting provides relevant information to investors and financial analysts has well been proved by the large number of studies carried out on the topic since the late '60s 4 . Anyway the incentive to voluntarily provide segment reporting to reduce information asymmetry is limited by the existence of relevant proprietary costs. First of all, costs of preparing and disseminating segment information must be considered.
Segment reporting is not easy to produce because of a number of technical issues to be solved, such as segment definition, transfer prices or overhead allocation. This is especially true when reported segments do not correspond to internal organizational divisions or legally identifiable sub-entities 5 . Since when the first studies on the topic were carried out, managers have expressed concern about the costs to be born to prepare a reliable segment reporting (Mautz, 1968; Backer and McFarland, 1968; Boersema and Van Weelden, 1992) . More recently this concern was again expressed when comments and opinions were collected in the process to issue SFAS 131 and IAS 14 revised (FASB, 1997; Epstein and Mirza, 1998) . Another concern raised by managers is that technical issues related to segment reporting preparation are reflected in higher audit fees, since testing segment disclosure requires extra work for auditors (Sanders, Alexander and Clark, 1999) . But even more relevant than preparation and dissemination costs are the potential disadvantages coming from the use of segment reporting by competitors and other parties. By definition segment reporting gives details about the company's operating margins, return on assets and growth rate in its different lines of business. These may reveal to competitors and other parties (like customers) the existence of weaknesses or opportunities to be exploited to their own advantage. Since the issue of the first accounting standards on the topic managers have expressed the concern that such a disclosure would erode the firm's competitive advantage (Mautz, 1968; AICPA, 1994; Sanders, Alexander and Clark, 1999; Deppe and Omer, 2000) .
Some theoretical and analytical studies were also developed to model the relationship between segment disclosure and competitive costs (Feltham, Gigler and Hughes, 1992; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998) , proving that these costs are particularly relevant for such a kind of disclosure.
Because of the difficulty of measuring proprietary costs, empirical research on their impact on segment reporting has been quite limited until now. For this reason
Proprietary Costs Theory may be very useful to identify potential new determinants of voluntary segment disclosure.
The hypotheses
On the basis of the theoretical framework just described, a number of research hypotheses have been developed, each correlating segment reporting quality to a potential determinant.
Correspondence between segments and legally identifiable subgroups of companies
As stated in the previous section, costs of preparing segment reporting tend to be higher when reported segments do no correspond to the way segments are organized within the reporting entity for management purposes. When the reporting entity is a group of companies, segments may correspond to legally identifiable subgroups of companies, so that segment reporting coincides with the "sub-consolidated" financial statements related to these subgroups. When such a coincidence exists, costs of preparing segment information are lower since most of segment data are already internally available for management purposes or, at least, are easier to produce because of the more limited technical problems (i.e. common revenues or overhead allocation) to be overcome. As a reflection, also audit costs are expected to be lower. The following hypothesis may then be formulated:
Hp1 -The quality of voluntary segment disclosure is higher when segments coincide with legally identifiable subgroups of companies
In Italy there are cases in which subgroups are required by law to prepare and publish their own consolidated financial statements, specifically when:
-the sub-holding is listed, or -the main holding owns no more than 95% of its shares, and the preparation of consolidated accounts is required by a number of shareholders who represent at least 5% of the share capital of the same sub-holding.
The existence of such a legal requirement may bias the results. Actually, when segments coincide with legally identifiable subgroups of companies which are required by law to prepare and disclose their own consolidated financial statements, segment reporting results as a consequence of the compliance with the law more than as a voluntary choice of the holding company. In order to avoid the risk of any bias in the results due to mandatory disclosure, the groups in which the above-mentioned legal requirement occurs have been excluded from the sample.
Level of detail in segment definition
As stated before, segment reporting reveals information about the company's margins, returns and investment strategies in its different markets and lines of business. This information may be used by competitors, customers and other parties to the disadvantage of the disclosing company. As theoretically stated in literature (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996) , the more disaggregated the segments, the more useful information is to competitors and other parties, then the higher the proprietary costs for the company.
When segments are defined to a lower level of detail (or disaggregation) operating margins, rates of return and investment decisions related to different products/markets are combined, so that a less detailed picture of the company's strategies is provided to external parties. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:
Hp2 -The quality of voluntary segment disclosure is negatively correlated to the level of detail in segment definition
It may be objected that there is some circularity in the hypothesis since the level of detail in segment definition may be considered, by itself, a measure of the quality of segment reporting. This might well be true if quality is defined from a general point of view. Anyway, in the present study the point of view of investors is assumed, since segment reporting is produced mostly to satisfy financial market's information needs 6 .
From investors' point of view, level of detail in segment definition is not necessarily an indicator of information quality. What is important for them is that segments are different as concerns returns, risks and growth rates. This means that segments may be aggregated if they have similar returns, risks and growth rates without affecting disclosure quality for investors. Moreover, quality is also related to materiality of disclosed information. For the information to be material, disclosed segments cannot be too many in number or too small in relation to size of the reporting entity, as also stated by the main accounting standards on the topic 7 . This means that if a reporting entity has a large number of small segments it is necessary to aggregate them in order to make the information related to each segment more material. For the above-mentioned factors, level of detail in segment definition may not be considered an indicator of segment reporting quality.
Growth rate
Competitive costs deriving from disclosing segment information tend to be particularly high for growing companies. Business growth is usually related to the existence of growing markets or to the entry into new profitable markets. In both cases segment reporting may reveal to competitors the existence of business opportunities, to the potential disadvantage of the disclosing company. As a consequence, voluntary segment disclosure quality is expected to be negatively correlated to the company's growth rate.
The following hypothesis is then formulated:
Hp3 -The quality of voluntary segment disclosure is negatively correlated to the company's growth rate
Listing status age
Proprietary costs related to segment disclosure are also expected to be affected by the "listing status age" of the disclosing company, which is defined as the length of time for which the company has been listed on the Stock Exchange.
As stated in literature (Mautz, 1968; Baker and McFarland, 1968; Sanders, Alexander and Clark, 1999) , segment reporting production and dissemination costs tend to be higher when companies are not used to prepare it. Older listed companies are more familiar with financial analysts' information needs. Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is expected that the longer the time the company has been listed, the longer it has been preparing segment information in response to financial analysts' information requests, therefore the lower the production and dissemination costs to be sustained. As a consequence, the following hypothesis may be formulated:
Hp4 -The quality of voluntary segment disclosure is positively correlated to the company's "listing status age".
The control variables
In order to isolate the effect of the above-mentioned determinants from the impact of other factors, a number of control variables were included in the model. These variables were selected on the basis of a survey of prior research on the determinants of segment voluntary disclosure ( Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Bradbury, 1992; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Kelly, 1994; Apellaniz and Zardoya, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1995; Herrmann and Thomas, 1996; Giner et al., 1997; Saada, 1998; Leuz, 1999) . In order to limit the number of variables included in the model, only the variables included in more than one of the previous studies and which proved to be significantly related to voluntary segment disclosure in most of the studies in which they were explicitly considered were selected. These variables are size, ownership diffusion, financial leverage and profitability.
Size
Size is expected to be positively related to voluntary segment disclosure quality.
Production and dissemination costs are relatively lower for larger companies because of the large fixed component of such costs. Moreover, competitive costs are relatively lower for larger companies, since these companies are less vulnerable to competition and have a stronger position in their contractual relationship with clients and suppliers.
This means that for larger companies there are lower proprietary costs and, as a consequence, lower incentives to keep segment information. The existence of a significant positive relationship between size and segment disclosure was confirmed by Salamon and Dhaliwal (1980) , Bradbury (1992) , Mitchell et al. (1995) , Hermann and Thomas (1996) , Giner et al. (1997) , Saada (1998) and Leuz (1999) .
Ownership diffusion
The more a company's ownership is widespread among investors on the market, the greater the distance between owners and managers and thus the greater the information asymmetry between them. Since segment reporting, like all financial accounting information, is unanimously considered to be a means to reduce information asymmetry, a positive relationship is expected to be found between ownership diffusion and segment reporting quality. The existence of a significant positive relationship between ownership diffusion and segment disclosure was proved by McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Giner et al. (1997) , Saada (1998) and Leuz (1999) .
Financial leverage
Since segment reporting may be used by managers to enhance monitoring in the agency relationship with lenders, it is expected that as the rate of financial leverage increases, companies are more motivated to disclose segment information in order to reduce the information asymmetry with creditors. Thus a positive relationship is expected to be found between the rate of financial leverage and voluntary segment disclosure quality.
The existence of a significant positive relationship between financial leverage and segment disclosure was previously confirmed by Dhaliwal (1980), Bradbury (1992) and Giner et al. (1997) . Contrary to what expected, a significant but negative relationship between the two variables was found by Kelly (1994) .
It must be pointed out here that in the Italian context, where banks are the typical lenders, the relationship between the two variables may become less clear since companies may privately provide detailed information to the banks without disclosing it in the annual reports. Nevertheless a positive relationship is still expected since anyway the costs to produce and disclose segment information to the financial market via annual reports are lower for those companies that already produce it to satisfy creditors' information needs.
Profitability
The relationship between profitability and voluntary segment disclosure quality has proved to be a complex one. Profitability is considered to be an indicator of an investment quality. It is therefore expected that the higher it is the more the company is boosted to disclose segment information in order to reduce the risk to be adversely selected by the market. On the other side, competitive costs deriving from segment disclosure tend to increase as profitability of the reporting entity increases, which leads to the expectation of a negative relationship between the two variables. In most of previous studies profitability proved to be a significant determinant of segment disclosure, but there is no clear evidence concerning the direction of the relationship. A positive correlation was found by Giner et al. (1997) and Saada (1998) , while a negative one was found by Kelly (1994) and Leuz (1999) . Therefore no specific sign will be a priori assigned to such a relationship in the present study.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The sample
The sample was selected among the list of all non-financial Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange in 1997. All subsidiaries of foreign companies were excluded, as were all the companies listed on a foreign Stock Exchange where segment reporting was already mandatory. Among the remaining companies (152 in total) a content analysis of the 1997 consolidated annual report was carried out in order to distinguish diversified from non-diversified companies. In particular companies describing their activities as diversified or as consisting of different lines of business or geographical markets were included in the sample. Holdings of groups in which all the segments coincided with legally identifiable entities (single companies or subgroups of companies) required by law to prepare and disclose their own financial statements were also excluded from the sample in order to limit the analysis to voluntary disclosure 8 .
Groups in which such a coincidence was observed for some but not all the segments were included in the sample but the analysis was focused only on the segments for which disclosure was voluntary.
After realizing that geographical segment disclosure was particularly limited among
Italian companies (Prencipe, 1999) , the empirical analysis was limited only on line of business segments. Therefore companies diversified exclusively on a geographical basis were excluded from the sample.
The final sample was composed of 67 companies. A list of the companies included in the sample is reported in Appendix.
Variables and measurement
The dependent variable
Since segment reporting is primarily provided to satisfy financial markets' information needs, as already mentioned before, the financial analysts' point of view is adopted in measuring information quality. In particular, the natural logarithm of the number of items disclosed for each segment is used as measure of segment reporting quality. The choice of this measure is based on the assumption that the quality of segment disclosure for financial analysts is positively related to the number of disclosed items. The existing literature provides evidence that financial analysts use segment information to estimate the risk and predict the returns of investments. Since each one of the items included in the counting -which correspond to those required by IAS 14 -has proved to be useful for financial analysts in estimating the riskiness and/or the prospective profitability of the reporting entity (Mautz, 1968; Baker and McFarland, 1968; Boersema and Van Weelden, 1992; AICPA, 1994) , the higher the number of items disclosed for each segment the better the estimates the analysts are able to make. Anyway, it was proved that the marginal contribution of each additional piece of information to the estimating ability of financial analysts, while positive, tends to decrease as the total number of items disclosed for each segment increases (Collins, 1976) . Therefore, the natural logarithm of the number of disclosed items is calculated in order to consider such aspect.
As mentioned before, the items considered in the counting are the ones IAS 14 requires for primary segments: external revenue, inter-segment revenue, operating result, segment assets, segment liabilities, capital expenditure, depreciation and amortization, other non-cash expenses, basis of inter-segment pricing. All the items listed above are relevant for all the companies included in the sample. IAS 14 also requires to disclose in certain cases the "share of profit or loss of equity and joint venture investments", but, since this item was not applicable to most of the companies in the sample, it was excluded from the counting. When a different number of items was found for different segments of the same reporting entity, a weighted average (based on sales) of the number of items disclosed was adopted as measure of the overall segment disclosure quality.
The independent variables
Tab. 1 describes how each independent variable is measured.
(Insert here Tab. 1) Some specifications are needed about the measurement of the level of detail in segment definition. As shown in Tab. 1, this is measured on the basis of a 1-6 scale. In order to assign each sample company one of the scale's values, an official classification of economic activities was used 9 . In this classification, economic activities are classified into 6 different hierarchical levels, characterized by a growing degree of detail:
1=macrosectors, 2=classes, 3=subclasses, 4=categories, 5=subcategories and 6=sections. For each company the level corresponding to the definition of reported segments was identified. In such a way, notwithstanding the different activities performed, it was possible to use a standard basis to identify the level of detail at which segments were defined. When a different value was found for different segments of the same reporting entity, a weighted average (based on sales) of the values found was adopted as measure of the variable.
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables are reported in Appendix.
Methodology
A multivariate least squares regression model was used to test the hypotheses. The model was formulated as follows: 
RESULTS
The results of the regression model are shown in Tab Except for growth rate, all the other above-mentioned variables proved to be significant determinants of segment reporting quality, consistently to what hypothesized. These results confirm that proprietary costs -costs to produce and disseminate information and competitive costs related to the risk that disclosed information may be used by competitors or other parties to the disadvantage of the company -are particularly relevant for segment reporting, thus limiting the incentive for the companies to provide this information to the market. Growth rate is the only one of the new determinants which is not found to be significantly correlated to segment reporting quality, even if the negative sign of the coefficient is consistent with the proprietary costs hypothesis.
The lack of significance is probably due to the fact that growth rate may also be considered as an indicator of an investment quality. Therefore, even if competitive costs deriving from disclosure are higher for growing companies, these may be more incentived to give information to the market in order to reduce information asymmetry and the risk to be adversely selected by the market, similarly to what stated with reference to profitability. This effect may have at least partially counterbalanced the negative impact of proprietary costs, thus making the relationship between segment reporting quality and growth rate a not significant one. Therefore the agency relationship with lenders is a very relevant one. The results confirm that companies produce segment information in order to reduce agency costs in the relationship with financial creditors, and that once they produce such information for lenders they also disclose it in the annual reports.
This study may be of particular interest to regulators and standard-setting bodies when evaluating mandatory disclosure. Anyway the findings should be interpreted keeping into consideration some limits. First of all, the analysis is focused on large listed companies, so that the conclusions cannot be generalized to smaller-sized companies.
Second, all the conclusions drawn are based on the underlying hypothesis that companies decide to disclose or not to disclose segment information on a strictly rational basis, after analyzing all costs and benefits deriving from the decision. Actually not always this hypothesis is consistent with companies' behavior. Further research, based on a deeper analysis of companies' decision processes, may provide useful evidence on the relevance of proprietary costs for segment reporting disclosure decisions. 
NOTES
Tab. 1 Description and measurement of independent variables
